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Abstract
Despite established benefits in free trade, protectionism persists to varying degrees across 
the world. Why is that? Political institutions govern the ways in which competing trade-
policy preferences are aggregated, shaping policy outcomes. The ubiquitous binary PR/
plurality indicator in the trade-politics literature is divorced from comparative institutional 
research. We build on the latter body of research to generate a new 13-point index that cap-
tures the extent to which electoral systems incentivize personal-vote cultivation, based on a 
combination of established theoretical and new empirical evidence on candidate incentives. 
We argue that institutional incentives to pursue a personal vote are positively linked to the 
provision of particularistic policies, including trade protectionism. We find strong empiri-
cal support for the hypothesized relationship, and our results highlight the importance of 
applying parsimonious approaches to studying domestic institutions when analyzing their 
impact on foreign economic policy.
Keywords Electoral institutions · International political economy · Personal-vote 
incentives · Trade politics
1 Introduction
The domestic sources of trade policies have long been a subject of inquiry, from the 
sources of demands to the ways in which those demands are translated by domestic and 
international institutions into policy outcomes. To date, research on the effects of domestic 
political institutions on trade policies among democracies has produced a series of contra-
dictory arguments and results. We argue that the measurement of domestic institutions in 
the existing studies often is far removed from the insights of comparative political institu-
tional research; consequently, institutions’ effects in shaping politicians’ incentives are not 
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captured adequately. We propose a more parsimonious approach to studying the effect of 
electoral systems on trade policy by examining the incentives they provide candidates to 
pursue the cultivation of personal votes.
The most common way of operationalizing electoral systems in studies of trade politics 
has been a dichotomous indicator, distinguishing systems labelled as either plurality (or 
majoritarian) or proportional representation (PR), despite significant differences between 
countries’ institutional arrangements within both of those groups. Despite several innova-
tions along these lines (such as Hankla 2006; Ehrlich 2007; Park and Jensen 2007), recent 
contributions to the literature have continued to point to the need for greater nuance in 
the measurement of electoral systems in the study of trade politics (Menocal 2011; Hat-
field and Hauk 2014; Rickard 2015). We answer that call and present an index that cap-
tures personal vote-cultivation incentives, based on the seminal work of Carey and Shugart 
(1995) and informed by recent empirical contributions by André et al. (2016), accounting 
for variation among electoral systems well beyond the standard majoritarian-PR divide. By 
combining institutional supply and candidate-driven demands for building political sup-
port, our approach more accurately captures politicians’ incentives to respond to demands 
for protectionism than do earlier approaches. We find significant support for a link between 
personal-vote incentives and protectionist trade policies, contributing to the body of evi-
dence pointing to the importance of domestic political institutions in shaping trade-policy 
outcomes.
2  The domestic politics of trade
The distributional consequences of trade lead to competing demands over trade policy, 
which are filtered through electoral institutions. The configurations those institutions take 
influence the extent to which politicians respond to the demands. The standard treatment 
of electoral systems in trade-politics research is to enter a binary indicator distinguishing 
between plurality/majoritarian and proportional representation (PR) systems, following the 
seminal treatment by Rogowski (1987).
The conclusions reached in the literature often fall on either side of a central debate: 
that either plurality or PR leads to more protectionist policies. Rogowski (1987) proposes 
a relationship between PR systems and more open trade policies, with the affinity between 
PR and free trade attributed to the former’s tendency to produce fewer, larger electoral 
districts and strong, autonomous parties, as well as its ability to provide insulation against 
trade-based exogenous shocks, compared to majoritarian systems.
Among the influential work examining electoral systems and economic policy more 
broadly, Persson and Tabellini (2003) (PT henceforth) find that PR systems are correlated 
with broadly beneficial policies and plurality systems lead to targeted, narrowly beneficial 
policies. PT contend that the larger average district magnitude in PR systems should pro-
duce fewer incentives for legislators to seek rents or cultivate personal votes. As such, plu-
rality electoral rules should correspond with more trade protection owing to greater recep-
tiveness to lobbying by firms or industries that are or would be vulnerable to competition 
with more competitive foreign firms. Other scholars reach analogous conclusions with dif-
ferent arguments: Knutsen (2011) contends that landslide wins under plurality rules lead to 
more rent seeking and particularistic policy-making by legislators; Saksena and Anderson 
(2008) attribute the link between PR systems and liberal trade policies to the insulation of 
politicians from special interest lobbying. Ito (2015), Grossman and Helpman (2005) and 
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Hatfield and Hauk (2014) all find evidence of a relationship between PR systems and freer 
trade policies in panel analyses across a range of samples.
On the other side of the debate over the relationship between electoral systems and pro-
tectionism, Mansfield and Busch (1995) contend that the insulation of politicians in PR 
systems, rather than reducing the impact of special-interest politics, instead leads to more 
rent seeking and, thus, more protectionism. Rogowski and Kayser (2002), Chang et  al. 
(2008) and Weinberg (2012) propose analogous arguments, finding support in consumer 
price levels that they treat as a proxy for trade policy liberalization. However, as Rickard 
(2012) observes, consumer prices capture a wide range of influences, including transporta-
tion costs, market size and consumer preferences, obfuscating the link between prices and 
protectionism.
Up to now, this brief review highlights the contradictions and inconclusiveness in prior 
research on the effects of electoral institutions on trade policy. Despite reliance on compa-
rable theoretical foundations, modeling techniques, and samples, researchers have reached 
opposing conclusions. The critique is far from new, as Park and Jensen (2007), Menocal 
(2011), Ehrlich (2011) and Rickard (2012) all have noted that the lack of consensus may 
be attributable to a misconception traceable back to the seminal paper by Rogowski (1987). 
The complexity of electoral institutions’ effects on economic policy cannot adequately be 
captured by a simple binary variable. PT, Blume et al. (2009) and Evans (2009) all recog-
nize the limitations of the rough proportionality dichotomy, and seek to address it in dif-
ferent ways. PT use a mixed-system binary indicator and continuous institutional variables, 
albeit primarily as a series of robustness checks. Blume et al. (2009) highlight the impor-
tance of measures more detailed than the dichotomous indicator. Evans (2009) acknowl-
edges mixed systems, but the operationalization largely is excluded from her analyses. A 
binary term for mixed systems will suffer from the same constraints as one for the PR-
plurality divide: the indicator captures a wide range of systems (such as mixed-member 
proportional [MMP] in Germany and mixed-member majoritarian [MMM]) in Japan, all 
of which can have wildly different effects on economic-policy outcomes, as demonstrated 
in the comparative institutional literature by Thames and Edwards (2006) and Shugart and 
Wattenberg (2001).
Our approach to obtaining a more nuanced electoral-system measure is by construct-
ing an index not unprecedented in the research on electoral politics and trade protection. 
Nielsen (2003) applies a similar index to the study of tariffs among middle-income presi-
dential democracies, Kono (2009) does so when assessing the influence of intra-industry 
trade on protectionist outcomes, and Crisp et  al. (2010) take an analogous approach to 
explaining exceptions contained in investment treaties. Hankla (2006) operationalizes the 
Carey and Shugart (1995) framework into four component index variables to assess the 
link between party strength and trade policy. We pick up where the existing studies leave 
off, by linking theory-based approaches to personal-vote incentives with recent empirical 
evidence of candidate behaviors (André et al. 2016).
3  Incentives to cultivate personal votes and trade protectionism
The effects of political institutions on interest aggregation have been the subject of exten-
sive theoretical and empirical work across political science and political economy. The 
significant advances in those fields have not extended to the study of trade politics, how-
ever, which has been hampered by simplistic institutional modeling. As Shugart (2005) 
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observes, the plurality-PR divide, which dominates prior research, is no more important 
than whether voters choose individuals or parties. Within the broad PR and majoritarian 
electoral families several different electoral systems exist, the effects of which more closely 
resemble systems from the opposite class than those they have been grouped alongside. 
That diversity can lead to heterogeneous within-category effects and contradictory results, 
even when similar analyses are conducted. We rely on insights from the comparative-
politics literature on electoral institutions, particularly Carey and Shugart (1995), Shugart 
(2005), Cox and McCubbins (2001) and André et al. (2016), to create a more theoretically 
and empirically grounded measure of institutional effects on politicians’ incentives, and 
consequently, economic-policy outcomes.
3.1  Electoral incentives and the personal vote
The incentive structures of both political candidates and elected officials are shaped 
directly in substantial ways by the rules that govern electoral competition, as well as the 
impact of those rules on voters’ information demands (Cox and McCubbins 2001). Operat-
ing under the constraints of limited time and information, voters in a democracy often rely 
on the signals provided by parties and candidates for information when making their elec-
toral choices. The type of signals voters demand—and those provided in response by poli-
ticians seeking election—depends on the nature of electoral institutions. In party-centric 
electoral systems, such as South Africa’s closed-list PR (CLPR), voters require information 
only on parties’ policy platforms, as they distinguish each party (or bloc or coalition). If 
the electoral institutions allow voters to select candidate-specific preferences (such as in 
open-list PR, single non-transferable vote (SNTV) and plurality systems), voters will seek 
information on candidates, as it becomes necessary to distinguish them from their coun-
terparts both within and across parties. Such institutions foster intraparty competition in 
addition to interparty competition (Cox and McCubbins 2001; Crisp et al. 2007); in order 
to pursue (re)election, politicians in those circumstances will need to create a connection 
between themselves and their constituencies beyond that provided by their party’s reputa-
tion and platform.
Where electoral institutions incentivize the cultivation of a personal vote by fostering 
stronger intraparty than interparty competition, conflicts of interests may arise between 
candidates and their respective party leaders (Carey and Shugart 1995). While candidates 
are interested primarily in their own (re)election prospects, parties and party leaders are 
interested in maximizing the total number of seats won in the district and legislature. 
Within personal-vote systems, maintaining party reputation becomes a collective-action 
problem, the extent of which is determined significantly by electoral rules and the extent 
to which they incentivize the cultivation of a personal vote. Such incentives stand in clear 
contrast to those found in party-focused electoral systems, such as CLPR, wherein a dis-
tinct and clearly defined party brand benefits the party as a whole, and party leaders have 
an incentive to discourage any independent candidate behaviors that deviate from the 
party line. Consequently, the more candidate-centric the electoral system is, the greater 
is the likelihood that candidates will pursue the cultivation of their own reputations, as 
those will have greater weight relative to that of their party. As candidates cater to the nar-
rowly defined interests within their districts to gain (re)election, they often support and 
enact particularistic policies, which benefit these narrow groups at the expense of provid-
ing broader-based public goods. Those policies contribute greatly to candidates’ personal 
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reputations, while policies with broadly diffuse benefits serve to bolster the party’s regional 
or national reputation.
Carey and Shugart (1995) define four variables affecting the degree to which electoral 
institutions incentivize cultivation of a personal vote. They are ballot control, vote pool-
ing, types of votes, and district magnitude. When combined, the four variables enable a 
ranked ordering of electoral systems based on personal-vote cultivation incentives. While 
the original Carey–Shugart index relies on the hypothetical incentives created by institu-
tional arrangements, recent interview-based research by André et  al. (2016) has pointed 
to some deviations between hypothetical and revealed incentives across electoral systems. 
The effects of those institutional characteristics remain more or less fixed across countries 
with readily defined electoral systems.
3.2  Political incentives and trade policy
Having illustrated how electoral institutions can shape the incentives political actors face, 
the question remains: how do they impact international trade policy and economic policy 
more generally? The political demands that politicians face over trade policy are shaped by 
a range of interests. A common approach, treating the welfare gains from liberalization as a 
public good, pitting pro-trade consumers against protectionist producers (Rogowski 1987; 
Grossman and Helpman 1994, 2005). The extent to which those demands are represented 
in policy outcomes depends crucially on the configuration of political institutions and the 
ways in which they shape candidate interests: when politicians are rewarded for cultivating 
the support of narrowly delineated groups, their efforts tend to favor protectionist interests 
(Baldwin and Robert-Nicoud 2007).
However, the distribution of trade-policy demands in practice is not distributed so neatly 
between consumers and producers. Public opinion on the benefits of trade liberalization 
often is divided, reflecting trade’s distributional consequences as well as concerns over 
its implications for specific communities (Kuo and Naoi 2015). Furthermore, consumer 
tastes vary with respect to foreign and domestic goods and services, further contributing to 
divided attitudes (Baker 2005). Among producers, similar divisions in trade-policy stances 
exist, based on heterogeneity in firm characteristics and the prospects and threats posed by 
international economic integration (Bernard et al. 2007; Plouffe 2015, 2017).
When fractionalization of attitudes toward trade combines with politicians’ institution-
ally derived interests in creating supporting coalitions, the result is the use of a variety 
of policy tools to assemble winning coalitions within their constituencies. While trade is 
just a single example of the countless policies that could be linked to political support, the 
highly technical and complicated nature of trade policy makes it relatively easy for politi-
cians to hide any preferential policies from non-recipient groups (Kono 2006). The ability 
to obfuscate redistributive transfers should make trade more attractive than other policy 
options when it comes to their use for purely electoral gains, whether protection is imple-
mented through product-level tariffs or non-tariff barriers. When personal-vote incentives 
are absent or weak, politicians can rely on party platforms as a basis for political support. 
However, where the incentives to cultivate a personal vote abound, politicians can target 
aspects of trade policy to build support among groups of potential voters.
When seeking to build support by backing narrowly targeted trade policies, politicians 
choose between liberalizing and protectionist options. Asymmetries exist between the two 
with respect to the excludability of any benefits from constituents outside the targeted 
group. In the case of liberalizing policies, targeting beneficiaries is difficult: heterogeneity 
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in consumption preferences and the varying salience of access to foreign products makes 
that option relatively unattractive for the support-building politician. In contrast, protec-
tionist policies can be targeted with relative ease based on production patterns within the 
intended constituency.
4  Research design and methodology
4.1  Dataset and model specification
As with any study of the effects of electoral systems, the population of interest is con-
fined to democracies. We rely on the Varieties of Democracy (V-Dem) Polyarchy scale 
(Coppedge et al. 2016) as our starting point, with its focus on competition and participa-
tion in political systems. As the original Polyarchy dataset’s creator Tatu Vanhanen notes, 
democracy can be defined as a “political system in which power is widely distributed 
among its members and in which the status of power holders is based on the consent of 
the people” (Vanhanen 1984, p. 11). We limit the sample to countries scoring 0.4 or higher 
on the Polyarchy scale, which provides a compromise between inclusiveness and the cap-
ture of highly democratic countries. Admittedly, that strategy does lead to the inclusion of 
hybrid regimes and, in some cases, country-year observations that may be described only 
as notionally democratic, but any potential bias introduced by pseudo-democracies would 
be towards a null result, as non-democratic sources of campaign incentives are likely to 
override or conflict with those generated by the electoral institutions themselves. When the 
Polyarchy threshold is increased to prune the questionably democratic observations from 
analysis, our results remain substantively similar. Our sample also omits countries that 
are EU members by removing them from the sample at their year of accession. We do so 
because of the confounding effects of intra-EU decision making and following the exam-
ples of recent work by the likes of Weinberg (2016) and Lechner and Wüthrich (2017). 
Furthermore, we omit a small number of country-year observations that are more than 
three standard deviations from the mean trade freedom index (TFI) score. Those cases are 
addressed further in the online appendix. The resulting sample is global in scope, a notable 
contrast to the existing literature, which typically focuses on developed countries or spe-
cific regions. In total, the dataset covers up to 97 countries over the 1990–2012 period,1 
although data coverage for covariates reduces the number of countries analyzed to between 
67 and 97.
The model we specify to estimate the relationship between electoral institutions and 
trade policy takes the general form:
The outcome, yit , is one of three dependent variables measuring international trade 
policy; xit represents time-varying, observation-level (or level 1) independent variable(s); 
x̄i is the country mean for variable x ; and zi is time-invariant independent variable(s) 
at the clustered (or level 2) country-level. Following Bell and Jones (2015) and Bell, 
Johnston and Jones (2014), 훽
1
 represents the estimated within country effect(s) of the 
yit = 𝛽0 + 𝛽1
(
xit − x̄i
)
+ 𝛽
2
x̄i + 𝛽3zi +
(
ui + 𝜖it
)
1 Missing data for a number of Eastern European and African states during 1990–1991 generates an unbal-
anced panel. The 2012 cutoff reflects data availability constraints when the current project began.
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time-varying variable(s) and 훽
2
 accounts for the between-country effect(s) of the time-var-
ying variable(s); 훽
3
 is the coefficient for the time-invariant, country-level variable(s). The 
independent variable of interest, electoral institutions, is included in the vector zi . Although 
some instances were encountered in which countries have enacted sweeping reforms of 
their electoral institutions, such cases are exceedingly rare. As such, the electoral-institu-
tion variable is considered to be slow moving or virtually time-invariant and accordingly is 
treated as time-invariant, keeping with standard practice (Bell and Jones 2015). Finally, ui 
represents the model’s random effects and 휖it is the level 1 residual error term.
The specified model is an example of the within-between random effects model 
(REWB) proposed by Bell and Jones (2015), similar to another random-effects (RE) model 
originally devised by Mundlak (1978). Although fixed effects (FE) are the de facto stand-
ard for dealing with panel data in economics and political science, we prefer the RE model 
for several reasons. FE’s prominent position derives from the fact that FE models tackle 
the problem of heterogeneity bias by using higher-level unit (country) dummy variables 
to account for all higher-level (between country) variance. In doing so, they rule out any 
sort of between-unit variance, eliminating their feasibility for a comparative analysis in 
our application: time-invariant processes effectively are suppressed, losing their effect on 
the outcome variable to the higher-level dummies. On the other hand, standard RE models 
can fail accurately to account for heterogeneity bias, producing biased results. The REWB 
is better able to account for such bias than standard RE models because it includes both 
within and between effects by partitioning what would otherwise be combined coefficients 
into separate effects for all time-varying variables. The within effect is interpreted simi-
larly to the FE modelling of an independent-variable effect over time within units, while 
the between effect models differences between units. Explicitly modelling those separate 
effects rather than demeaning or assuming one or the other away (as is the case in fixed 
effects and pooled models) allows researchers to measure differences between countries 
(or individuals, units, and so on) as well as changes within countries (or individuals, units, 
etc.) over time. That is accomplished while controlling for heterogeneity bias without 
throwing out time-invariant or slow-moving variables, such as electoral institutions.
4.2  Independent variables
Our principal independent variable is an ordinal ranking of electoral systems based on 
intraparty competition and the degree to which they incentivize personal-vote cultivation 
among individual legislators who seek reelection. This index is derived from Carey and 
Shugart’s (1995) (CS henceforth) typology of electoral institutions (described in greater 
detail above). In addition, the ranking is adjusted to account for discrepancies found by 
André et al. (2016) (ADM henceforth). Through thousands of interviews, ADM find that 
the incentives legislators actually encounter may differ in some cases from how they are 
hypothesized to occur in CS. Specifically, single-member plurality (SMP) and single-trans-
ferrable vote (STV) systems provide much stronger incentives to cultivate personal votes 
than predicted by CS. As such, those two systems have higher scores in our index than in 
the original CS index.
The CS (1995) paper provides a ranked list of theoretically possible electoral sys-
tems based on the values imparted to legislators’ personal reputations relative to party 
reputation by each system, along with real-world examples of those that exist in prac-
tice. Higher values of this index indicate stronger incentives to cultivate personal votes 
and pursue particularistic policies, such as trade protection. Based on Bormann and 
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Golder’s (2013) Systems Around the World Index and numerous individual country case 
studies and reports (see list in the appendix), each country included in the sample is 
coded according to its electoral system and assigned a value based on the aggregate 
score assigned by Carey and Shugart (1995), reflecting performance on the four indica-
tors described earlier (ballot, vote, pooling and district magnitude) and adjusted in the 
aforementioned cases according to the findings of ADM; they are depicted in Table 1. 
Countries that underwent significant cases of electoral reform during the period under 
examination are discussed in the appendix. 
We include a number of additional controls in keeping with the established literature 
(sources are listed in the appendix). GDP per capita (based on purchasing power parity) is 
used to capture levels of economic development and is expected to be positively associated 
with trade openness. Country size, measured in terms of land mass, is entered as well; that 
variable has been associated with trade dependence (Hatfield and Hauk 2014); it is plausi-
ble that country size produces similar effects on trade barriers. Unemployment is included 
because governments facing high levels of unemployment are likely to face more pressure 
for protectionist policies. Finally, we include a measure of the state of the global economy 
as measured by the IMF’s World GDP estimates. The state of the global economy can have 
an independent impact on trade flows and the policies meant to insulate national economies 
in times of crisis; World GDP is treated as an individual non-specific, time-invariant con-
trol variable. Following research by Simmons et al. (2008), we enter regional averages of 
the time-varying dependent variables lagged by one year to control for the potential effects 
of regional policy diffusion.
Along with the foregoing non-policy economic and geographic controls, a series of 
dummy variables is included to represent the origins of each country’s legal system. The 
economic implications of legal origins are well-established across the political economy 
literature (see, for example, La Porta et al. 1997; Persson and Tabellini 2003), embracing 
Table 1  Personal-vote index with ADM-derived changes
Personal vote score Electoral system type Example
0 Closed-list PR (CLPR) Israel
1 Open-list PR (OLPR) with multiple votes (MV) Switzerland
2 Mixed-member proportional (MMP) New Zealand
3 Alternative vote Australia
4 OLPR with single vote Chile
5 Block vote Fiji
6 OLPR SV with open endorsement Brazil
7 Single-member plurality with party endorsement Taiwan
8 Two-round system Comoros
9 Single-member plurality without party endorsement Philippines
10 Mixed-member majoritarian (MMM) Japan
11 Single transferable vote (PR-STV) Ireland
12 Personal-list PR/single non-transferable vote (SNTV) Colombia
Electoral system type CS score New score Reason
Single member plurality 0 9 Party ballot control turns out to be less influential
Single transferable vote 3 11 Highly emphasizes personal vote importance by 
pitting co-partisans against one another
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their effects on economic-policy outcomes. Finally, we include a measure of population 
density, which has been positively linked to trade engagement (Keesing and Sherk 1971).
4.3  Dependent variables
We adopt three alternative measures of protectionism. Two are used in Hatfield and Hauk 
(2014) and so have the added benefit of serving as points of comparison with some recent 
research. The two variables are trade-weighted average ad-valorem tariff (AT) from the 
World Bank’s World Development Indicators Database and the Overall Trade Restrictive-
ness Index (OTRI) developed by Kee et al. (2013). The third measure of trade protection 
is the Trade Freedom Index (TFI) developed by the Heritage Foundation (2016), which 
has been scaled to account for its non-normal distribution. Each has its own limitations, 
particularly with respect to data coverage; however, by testing our argument against three 
measures of protection, we aim to demonstrate a more robust relationship between institu-
tional personal-vote incentives and trade policy.
The log-transformed average ad-valorem tariff (AT) benefits from its widespread appli-
cation, ease of measurement, and the way in which it readily lends itself to cross-national 
comparisons. The use of AT measures has been criticized for the weighting mechanism 
and the lack of consideration of the impact of non-tariff barriers (NTBs) (Hatfield and 
Hauk 2014). The impact of the World Trade Organization further dampens the utility of 
the AT measure, as tariff levels for members on many product lines are bound within those 
allowed under the WTO.
The second measure, OTRI, captures a broader range of protectionist measures than 
does AT. OTRI takes the estimated effect of a country’s total trade barriers and provides an 
equivalent ad-valorem tariff applied across all sectors, which would produce the same level 
of imports as the system currently in place. Of course, that measure, too, has its drawbacks: 
it is based on estimated “import demand elasticities and non-tariff barrier ad-valorem 
equivalents” and thus “likely suffers from measurement error”; it is available, so far, only 
for one year: 2009. (Hatfield and Hauk 2014, p. 525).
The TFI is a similarly broad trade-policy measurement based on data collected from the 
World Bank, WTO, the Economist Intelligence Unit, and individual government publica-
tions from each country included in the index. The resulting index captures the absence of 
both tariffs and NTBs; while it is similar to OTRI in its conceptual formulation, the direc-
tionality is reversed, with a maximum score of 100 indicating full trade openness and a 
minimum score of zero indicating pure autarky. Consequently, comparable results between 
AT and OTRI will retain the same sign, while the sign will flip for TFI: stronger (weaker) 
institutional personal-vote incentives will lead to higher (lower) AT and OTRI outcomes, 
and lower (higher) TFI scores.
5  Results
Regression results are displayed in Tables 2 and 3 with country-clustered robust standard 
errors in parentheses. For AT and TFI, the REWB model is estimated, with the means 
of the xij variables entered as explanatory variables, as recommended by Bell and Jones 
(2015). Ordinary least squares (OLS) is used to analyze the smaller, purely cross-sectional 
OTRI sample, following Hatfield and Hauk (2014). All coefficients for the estimated 
effect of personal-vote cultivation incentives modelled by the electoral systems variable 
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are statistically significant in the expected direction. Our full specification also is robust 
against multicollinearity (VIF results are presented in Table A1 in the appendix).
Models 1–3 estimate that the link between the institutional personal-vote cultivation 
incentives and AT is positive, as expected. In the simple univariate model, the effect of 
a single rank increase along the personal-vote cultivation scale corresponds to a 0.046 
increase in AT. In Models 2 and 3 the estimated effect is reduced by about half (to 
0.03 and 0.029) after inclusion of, first, geographic and economic control variables and 
then legal origin variables, respectively. The effect is statistically significant throughout. 
The control variables all show the expected effects, except for country size, which has 
a negative impact on AT. It has been argued elsewhere that smaller countries will trade 
more out of necessity, which one might expect to lead to lower tariffs as trade policy 
and market access tend to be reciprocal. A possible explanation is that the connections 
in geographically smaller countries between legislators, lobbyists, and the electorate are 
closer, which could lead to more lawmakers being more responsive to protectionist pres-
sures, ceteris paribus, or that geographic size is proxying for market size. However, for 
AT, the effect is statistically insignificant. The inverse relationship between geography 
Table 3  OLS regression, 
electoral systems and OTRI
*p < 0.05, **p < 0.01, ***p < 0.001 Standard errors in parentheses
Log OTRI
(9) (10)
Electoral system 0.053** 0.052*
(0.016) (0.022)
L.GDP pc − 0.077
(0.078)
L.Land area 0.081
(0.052)
L.Pop.Den 0.139
(0.075)
Unemployment − 0.035**
(0.012)
UK legal origin − 0.523
(0.430)
FR leg. origin − 0.190
(0.408)
Socialist leg. origin − 0.511
(0.441)
DL leg. origin − 0.840
(0.545)
Electoral system 0.053** 0.052*
(0.016) (0.022)
L.GDP pc − 0.077
(0.078)
N 92 66
Adjusted  R2 0.099 0.321
Residual std. error 0.601 (df = 90) 0.593 (df = 64)
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and protection generally is consistent regardless of the dependent variable used, and fol-
lows results depicted in previous studies (for example, Hatfield and Hauk 2014), likely 
as a consequence of the marginal effect of the logarithmic transformation.
The within and between effects (WE and BE, respectively) of GDP per capita and 
population density are in the expected directions, so that an increase in either corre-
sponds to lower tariffs; the effects of both are quite large. As might be expected. Inter-
estingly, the WE coefficients for both are larger than for BE. Both effects for GDP per 
capita are significant and its estimated impact on AT likewise is quite large, as expected. 
The WE of unemployment has a significant negative effect on AT, though its estimated 
coefficient is considerably smaller than other state-level economic or geographic vari-
ables, which could reflect significant subnational variation in unemployment patterns 
and corresponding levels of sectoral protection. The adjusted  R2 is very high in the fully 
specified AT model in column 3, especially compared to similar studies that utilize the 
binary PR/plurality variable. For example, in Hatfield and Hauk (2014) the (standard) 
 R2 for their AT regressions with a binary electoral-system variable is less than a quarter 
of the reported (adjusted)  R2 here, which implies a better fit for the personal-vote index 
approach to electoral systems.
The results from TFI in Models 5–7 are similar to that of the AT results. Electoral sys-
tems incentivizing personal-vote cultivation are associated inversely with lower TFI scores 
(greater protectionism). The effect of including controls is to halve the substantive effect of 
personal-vote incentives, similar to the previous battery of models. Model fit, according to 
adjusted  R2, is slightly weaker than in the AT regressions, but remains very good.
The geographic and economic control variables behave in a manner similar to the pre-
vious models, with the exception of unemployment, which loses significance. That result 
could be explained by the complexity of NTBs relative to tariffs, which makes them a less 
useful policy tool for a legislator seeking to win over their constituents and cultivate a per-
sonal vote by addressing a particular problem (a logic similar to that presented by Kono 
2006). The legal origin indicators also are not significant in the TFI REWB models. Our 
measure of the global economy is significant and negatively associated with TFI, reflecting 
increasing protectionism as the global economy grows; most likely, that finding reflects 
policies enacted as governments sought to re-establish economic growth following the 
Great Recession.
Models 4 and 8 substitute a binary indicator for PR systems in place of our personal-
vote incentive index. We follow Evans (2009) in removing mixed systems and, as expected, 
the PR indicator is insignificant in the fully specified models. These results are slightly 
sensitive to the way in which mixed systems are treated (Table A7), raising the question of 
the sensitivity of similar results reported elsewhere in the literature.
Table 3 presents OLS regressions estimating the relationship between the personal-vote 
cultivation effect of electoral systems and OTRI. OTRI is similar to the TFI, although it 
approaches NTBs by estimating a comparable economy-wide average ad-valorem tariff, 
rather than treating NTBs in a qualitative and less transparent manner. The results of the 
OTRI models presented in Table 3 are consistent with those presented in Table 2 for AT 
and TFI. The coefficient for institutional personal-vote incentives is positive and significant 
in both Models 9 and 10; the penalty imposed by the battery of controls is much smaller 
than for the previous dependent variables, with the coefficient reduced only from 0.053 to 
0.052. Curiously, per capita GDP is not significant in Model 10, despite being significant 
in the REWB regressions, although the coefficient retains the expected sign. The same is 
true for the coefficients for land area and population density. Unemployment is statistically 
significant and its effects remain in the same direction as the AT and TFI models.
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Across all specifications, our results remain consistent: increases in institutionalized 
personal-vote incentives are associated with higher levels of trade protection. One final 
point worth mentioning is that, according to  R2, our electoral index alone explains nearly 
15% of the variation in tariff levels (see Model 1), and up to nearly 10% of the variation in 
combined trade protection (see Model 9).
6  Robustness checks and discussion
The statistical results reported in Tables 2 and 3 provide evidence supporting our argument 
that electoral systems providing stronger incentives to legislators to cultivate personal votes 
lead to more protectionist trade policies. Our electoral-institution index appears to serve as 
a more than capable replacement for the ubiquitous PR-plurality indicator. We conduct a 
number of further tests to ascertain the robustness of our approach.
Our sample is deliberately wide, admittedly allowing for a loose institutional definition 
of democracy, including a number of observations in which the political regime could be 
defined as hybrid or democratizing. The incentives created in hybrid or newly democratic 
systems, where the legislators are not necessarily accountable in the conventional sense 
to their constituencies, may be misrepresented by the ordinal institutional variable, which 
relies on democratic institutions as well as internalized democratic norms. To examine the 
effect among more consolidated democracies, we increase the Polyarchy threshold by 0.1 
and 0.2 (to 0.5 and 0.6, respectively), which leads to improved coefficients and statisti-
cal significance for the electoral systems variable run against both AT and TFI as well as 
improvements in model fit, as presented in Table 4. The strong performance of our institu-
tional index in Models 11–14 indicates that the inclusion of less consolidated democracies 
in our original sample biases against finding a result, as politicians in those electoral envi-
ronments are less responsive to institutional incentives, either because of the presence of 
strong non-institutional incentives or a lack of familiarity with the structure of their institu-
tionalized incentives.
We complement the foregoing tests with those on a sample derived from the ubiqui-
tous Polity IV index, where countries with a Polity 2 score of six or greater are defined as 
democratic, following a common convention. Those results, presented in the appendix, are 
substantively similar to the ones presented here. We also test a reduced-form version of our 
index, with the index collapsed into a three-point scale, representing electoral systems with 
low, medium and high personal-vote incentives. The results for those models, likewise pre-
sented in the appendix, also provide support for our argument here.
Recent research on institutions and trade policy additionally has sought to address con-
cerns of the potential endogeneity of electoral systems first described in Rogowski (1987). 
PT (2003), Evans (2009) and Hatfield and Hauk (2014) all address endogeneity by estimat-
ing two-stage least squares (2SLS) regressions, allowing them to control for correlation 
between the error term and endogenous regressors by running a first-stage OLS regression 
on the electoral-institution index and instrumental variables with which they may be caus-
ally related, and then substituting the first-stage fitted values for the electoral-institution 
index in the second-stage regression. We run 2SLS regressions with AT and TFI, includ-
ing instrumental variables for legal and colonial origins, geographic area, and the time of 
ratification of the current constitution, presenting the estimates in Table 5. The results for 
our electoral-system index remain consistent with those of our previous models, albeit with 
larger substantive effects.
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We also revisit our AT models, using multiple imputation to ensure that missingness 
and listwise deletion are not driving our results (Honaker and King 2010). As above, the 
process and results are discussed in greater detail in the appendix (Table A3). Finally, 
we incorporate an AR(1) correction on the fully specified models (Table A6). The com-
bined results serve to strengthen our confidence in those presented here: institutional 
incentives to cultivate personal votes are positively linked to trade protection.
Table 4  REWB regressions with higher Polyarchy thresholds
*p < 0.05, **p < 0.01, ***p < 0.001 Standard errors in parenthesis
DV, polyarchy threshold AT, 0.5 AT, 0.6 TFI, 0.5 TFI, 0.6
(11) (12) (13) (14)
Electoral system 0.035* 0.040** − 0.055* − 0.066**
(0.013) (0.014) (0.022) (0.024)
L.GDP pc within − 0.941*** − 0.964*** 1.362*** 1.351***
(0.143) (0.153) (0.274) (0.285)
L.GDP pc between − 0.275*** − 0.303*** 0.346*** 0.525***
(0.051) (0.065) (0.085) (0.101)
L.Land area − 0.038 − 0.023 0.004 0.005
(0.029) (0.028) (0.060) (0.065)
L.Pop.Den within − 0.540 − 0.478 1.021 0.850
(0.332) (0.386) (0.719) (0.783)
L.Pop.Den between − 0.001 0.006 − 0.115 − 0.181
(0.039) (0.047) (0.083) (0.092)
Unemployment within − 0.013 − 0.018* 0.003 − 0.015
(0.008) (0.008) (0.021) (0.021)
Unemployment between 0.005 0.007 − 0.003 − 0.017*
(0.006) (0.009) (0.008) (0.008)
AVTariff diffusion 0.413** 0.307*
(0.143) (0.140)
UK legal origin 0.373** 0.303 − 0.085 0.157
(0.132) (0.161) (0.225) (0.231)
FR leg. origin − 0.163 − 0.222 0.122 0.390
(0.135) (0.158) (0.344) (0.444)
Socialist leg. origin 0.150 0.124 0.147 0.743*
(0.190) (0.196) (0.287) (0.319)
DL leg. origin − 0.001 − 0.006 0.570 0.904*
(0.006) (0.007) (0.373) (0.416)
L. WOrld GDP − 0.003 0.001 − 0.031* − 0.042***
(0.008) (0.010) (0.012) (0.012)
TFI diffusion 0.111 − 0.015
(0.151) (0.139)
R2 0.527 0.507 0.411 0.426
Adj.  R2 0.519 0.496 0.396 0.408
Num. obs. 842 658 562 458
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Overall, our electoral-institution index performs well across a series of tests involv-
ing multiple measures of trade protection and over a large and varied dataset. It has 
the benefit of being well-grounded in research on comparative political institutions, and 
provides a more nuanced measure of the interests and opportunities that drive politi-
cians in their electoral environment than the common binary PR indicator. While some 
recent results have pointed away from the influence of party-driven electoral incentives 
(Hatfield and Hauk 2014), we find substantial evidence that those sorts of motivations 
do influence policy outcomes. Specifically, when comparing our personal-vote index to 
Table 5  2SLS results
*p < 0.05, **p < 0.01, ***p < 0.001 Standard errors in parenthesis
AT TFI
(15) (16)
Electoral system 0.065*** − 0.056**
(0.012) (0.020)
L.GDP pc within − 0.875*** 1.439***
(0.070) (0.135)
L.GDP pc between − 0.161*** 0.229***
(0.021) (0.037)
L.Land area − 0.067*** 0.049*
(0.013) (0.022)
L.Pop.Den within − 0.751*** 0.834*
(0.211) (0.413)
L.Pop.Den between − 0.054** − 0.040
(0.017) (0.028)
Unemployment within − 0.013 − 0.004
(0.008) (0.015)
Unemployment between 0.004 − 0.005
(0.003) (0.005)
L. World GDP 0.341*** − 0.042
(0.090) (0.168)
UK legal origin 0.515*** − 0.104
(0.093) (0.174)
FR leg. origin 0.038 0.023
(0.093) (0.176)
Socialist leg. origin 0.105 0.422*
(0.113) (0.208)
DL leg. origin − 0.001 − 0.030
(0.009) (0.016)
AvTariff diffusion 0.041***
(0.006)
TFI diffusion 0.372***
(0.069)
R2 0.529 0.503
Adj.  R2 0.522 0.492
Num. obs. 971 638
Public Choice 
1 3
Hankla’s (2006) party-strength index as employed by Hatfield and Hauk (2014), some 
notable differences emerge when politicians’ responses to their institutional environ-
ments are incorporated. Notably, party control over ballots in single-member plurality 
systems with party endorsement turns out to be less influential than previously theo-
rized (André et al. 2016). Consequently, the approach used by Hatfield and Hauk (2014) 
to capture politicians’ institutional incentives differs from ours in both what it tests, and 
how it measures the construct.
7  Conclusions
As a significant body of research has established, electoral institutions affect trade-pol-
icy outcomes. However, exactly how those institutions influence policy has remained 
contested, with a proliferation of contradictory arguments and results, often revolving 
around the use of a binary institutional indicator to model variation among electoral 
systems. While the PR/plurality divide is an intuitive starting point for capturing differ-
ences among electoral institutions, it is just one of several points of institutional varia-
tion, and on its own has little impact on politicians’ electoral incentives. Building on a 
large body of comparative institutional research, we create an index that better captures 
politicians’ incentives to pursue personal votes and use the index to explain trade pol-
icy, innovating on previous approaches focusing on electoral incentives by combining 
recent empirical evidence with an established index of institutionalized personal-vote 
incentives. Our index better captures the construct underlying the supply-side argument 
than previous approaches: politicians with stronger incentives to build support through 
particularistic means are more likely to respond by backing trade protection than those 
without such incentives. Within the index itself, plurality electoral systems are intermin-
gled with proportional-representation and other systems, highlighting the importance of 
other aspects of electoral systems in determining politicians’ incentives.
Testing this index against several measures of trade protection for a panel of democ-
racies yields support for our argument: increasing institutional personal-vote incentives 
lead to increases in trade protection. The results are robust across a range of model 
specifications and complement those of much of the existing literature. While the 
typical construction of the plurality-PR argument may not hold, the underlying intui-
tion—electoral systems influence politicians’ behaviors in response to protectionist 
demands—appears to remain accurate.
Our analysis more clearly points to the electoral mechanism through which protec-
tionist interests can influence trade policy, but pro-trade interests cannot be ignored. 
Indeed, as Betz (2017) has demonstrated, competition between these groups leads to 
observable patterns in policy outcomes. Further investigation into the ways that inter-
est-group demands interact with institutionally driven supply should prove fruitful in 
further explaining the forces that shape trade policy, both at the domestic level and by 
shaping international trade agreements.
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